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Abstract
In this paper, a novel interpretation of one of the problems of Hume scholarship is 
defended: his view of Metaphysical Realism or the belief in an external world (that there are 
ontologically and causally perception-independent, absolutely external and continued, i.e. 
Real entities). According to this interpretation, Hume’s attitude in the domain of philosophy 
should be distinguished from his view in the domain of everyday life: Hume the philosopher 
suspends his judgement on Realism, whereas Hume the common man firmly believes in the 
existence of Real entities. The defended reading is thus a sceptical and Realist interpretation 
of Hume. As such, it belongs to the class of what can be called no-single-Hume 
interpretations (Richard H. Popkin, Robert J. Fogelin, Donald L.M. Baxter), by contrast to 
single-Hume readings, which include Realist (naturalist, New Humean) and the traditional 
Reid-Green interpretation (i.e. Hume believes that there are no Real entities). Hume’s 
distinction between the domains of philosophy and everyday life, which is argued to be 
epistemological, is employed in order to reconcile his scepticism with his naturalism and 
constructive science of human nature. The paper pays special attention to the too much 
neglected second profound argument against the senses in Part 1, Section 12 of Hume’s first 
Enquiry and the corresponding argument in Section 4, Part 4, Book 1 of the Treatise.
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1. Introduction
As Don Garrett has observed (2005, xxv–xl and xxxiv), the relation between scepticism 
and naturalism in Hume’s thought has been the central question of Hume scholarship since 
Norman Kemp Smith’s ground-breaking The Philosophy of David Hume (1941). One of the 
essential aspects of this problem is Hume’s attitude to what is nowadays called Metaphysical 
Realism.1 The Humean understanding of such Realism both in An Enquiry concerning 
Human Understanding (Hereafter: first Enquiry) and A Treatise of Human Nature (Hereafter: 
Treatise) is that there are ontologically and causally (human) perception-independent, 
continued and absolutely external entities (EHU 12.7-8 and T 1.4.2.2).2 Thus, Hume's attitude 
to Realism is the same problem as his view of the problem of the external world. It is one of 
the most long-standing and central problems of reading and studying Hume's philosophy – 
and indeed, of modern philosophy.3
The question of Realism is significant for interpreting Hume’s philosophy in general, 
and for his theory of the understanding and metaphysics, in particular. An instance of this is 
the question whether Hume is a materialist, mind-body dualist, or neither. Corporeal 
substance and individual bodies are paradigm cases of Real entities in early modern 
philosophy.4 Thus, if Hume is a materialist or dualist, he must be a Realist, and if he is not a 
Realist, he cannot be a materialist or dualist. His view of the existence of Real entities is also 
connected to the discussion over Hume's theory of causation. If Hume is not committed to 
Realism in any sense of commitment, he cannot be committed to the existence of anything 
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Real that would ground causation as regularity between events (e.g. Real powers and 
necessity). Hume's attitude to Realism is therefore relevant for the New Hume debate.5
In this paper, my aim is to argue for a novel solution to the traditional problem of 
Hume’s view of Realism, and accordingly a novel interpretation of this part of his 
metaphysics, his theory of the understanding, and his view of the relation between scepticism 
and naturalism.6 My main thesis is that Hume should be seen as both a sceptic and a Realist. 
His philosophical position is to suspend his judgement on the existence of Real entities, 
whereas his everyday view is to believe firmly in their being. Hume the philosopher is a non-
Realist in the sense of not taking any stand on Realism, while Hume the common man is a 
Realist. My reading falls thus to the category of what I call below no-single-Hume 
interpretations, according to which more than one position ought to be attributed to his 
thinking in some respect. The key point in my reading is that there is a domain distinction 
between Hume’s philosophical and everyday views. Suspension of judgement and belief in 
Realism are attitudes that belong to different domains: Hume’s considered position in the 
philosophical domain, and his more natural view in the realm of everyday life.7 This 
distinction has significant consequences – as will be seen below – mainly because it avoids 
attributing a contradiction to Hume.
My main thesis and argument for it elaborate on my published doctoral dissertation 
(Hakkarainen 2007). In §2 of the paper, I outline the different interpretations of Hume's view 
of Realism defended so far in the literature. I discuss reasons for them in §3, which forms an 
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essential part of my argument, i.e. comparing the interpretations with each other. It also 
includes a short summary of the sceptical argument against the senses at the end of Part 1, 
Section 12 (Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy) of Hume's first Enquiry (EHU 12.15-
6). As Hume's presentation of this argument is so brief in the first Enquiry, the summary must 
also take use of the earlier version of the argument in Section 4 (Of the modern philosophy), 
Part 4 of the first Book of Hume's Treatise (T 1.4.4.3-11 and 15). Both arguments begin with 
the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Following Hume’s description 
closely, I call the first Enquiry version of the argument the second profound argument 
against the senses. This argument has been too much neglected in the literature compared 
with the first profound argument against the senses in EHU 12.7-14 and 16, and T 1.4.2 (Of 
scepticism with regard to the senses).8 It is the second profound argument against the senses 
that poses the strongest sceptical challenge. My interpretation takes this sceptical argument 
seriously. I bring forward my view in §4.
I finish the paper by concluding that Hume's philosophical position cannot involve two 
central varieties of Realism in early modern philosophy: materialism and mind-body dualism. 
I also observe that my interpretation poses serious difficulties for any interpretation that takes 
Hume committed to anything Real that would ground causation (such as some New Humean 
readings).
2. Outline of Different Interpretations
Formally, there are four possibilities of what Hume's doxastic attitude to Realism can 
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be. In the first place, he may believe (suppose, assume, or take for granted) that there are no 
Real entities. Let us call this the negatively dogmatic attitude because in it, Hume holds a 
belief, dogma, that not-p. In other words, he rejects Realism or denies the existence of Real 
entities. The second possibility is that Hume believes in their existence. He then affirms 
Realism and is positively dogmatic on the issue. Thirdly, Hume may be a genuine sceptic 
concerning Realism: his attitude is to suspend his belief in or judgement on the existence of 
Real entities. The last option in principle is some combination of these three. Hume is, for 
example, both a sceptic and positively dogmatic on Realism. As these combinative accounts 
attribute more than one position to Hume, I will call them no-single-Hume interpretations,  
readings, or accounts - metaphorically speaking, there is not just one Hume.
It was once the prevalent view that Hume denies the existence of Real entities: that he 
is negatively dogmatic. This is part of the Reid-Green line of interpretation, which sees Hume 
as a destructive thinker and negative dogmatist across the board.9 At the moment, the 
positively dogmatic account is by far the most popular among Hume scholars. It is part of 
both the naturalist and New Humean readings10, and also what can be called dialectic  
interpretations (such as those of Annette Baier and Donald W. Livingston, as explained 
below).
According to the father of the naturalist Hume interpretation, Kemp Smith, the belief in 
the existence of Real entities is one of the 'natural', fundamental human beliefs. It is 
involuntary, universal and practically necessary, an inevitable fact of the human condition. 
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As a result, no sceptical argument can undermine it. (Kemp Smith 2005, 124 and 126) Later, 
Barry Stroud has famously defended this interpretation in his book and especially in his 
recent article (1977, 115-7, and 2006, 339-51 and 340-5). The involuntariness thesis and 
Realist interpretation are also endorsed by Garrett, most clearly in 2004 (68-98, 83 and 90).
Wright's and Strawson's strategies for attributing commitment to the existence of in 
Real entities to Hume turns on Hume's theory of ideas providing means for supposing their 
existence even after the sceptical challenge (as explained below).
According to the dialectic readings of Hume by Livingston (1984, 2-4 and 9ff.), Baier 
(1991, 21 and 107), and William Edward Morris (2000, 96-102 and 106), the sceptical 
arguments that he presents are not really his own. Therefore the fact that Hume presents 
sceptical arguments against the belief in Real entities does not show that he rejects or 
suspends it. In fact, all of these commentators believe that Hume is a Realist.11
As far as I can tell, no one has so far defended the mere sceptical interpretation of 
Hume's attitude to Realism. However, it is one element in the no-single-Hume interpretations 
of Richard H. Popkin, Robert J. Fogelin, and Donald L.M. Baxter. All of them think that 
Hume is both a sceptic and a positive dogmatist regarding Real existence (I will go into the 
details of their views and arguments below).
3. Comparison of Interpretations
3.1 Negatively Dogmatic and Sceptical
On the one hand, it is not surprising that the negatively dogmatic interpretation was the 
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standard view in the light of a superficial reading of the first and second profound arguments 
against the senses in the first Enquiry and Of scepticism with regard to the senses (1.4.2), Of 
the modern philosophy (1.4.4), and Conclusion of this book (1.4.7) in the Treatise. On the 
other hand, this state of affairs is almost astonishing because of the fact that there just is no 
passage where Hume explicitly states that there are no Real entities. The closest he comes to 
this is in the last sentence of T 1.4.4: 'When we exclude these sensible qualities there remains 
nothing in the universe, which has such [Real] an existence.' (T 1.4.4.15) Nonetheless, 
putting this passage into its context – the conclusion of the argument at T 1.4.4 – challenges 
whether Hume is really signalling rejection of Real existence here. As will be seen below, the 
argument does not in fact sanction the denial of Real entities.
The negatively dogmatic reading of Hume in this question has thus insufficient textual 
basis. If there is a textually justified interpretation, that ought then to be preferred to it. In this 
respect, the mere sceptical interpretation has a slight advantage as I will show below. 
However, it suffers from another problem, which it shares with the negatively dogmatic 
reading: they have difficulties in explaining the indisputable naturalist element in Hume's 
thought. In the case of Real entities, this element is manifest in what I call the involuntariness  
passages.
3.2 Involuntariness Passages
Most of these passages are so well known that it suffices to consider them briefly. In 
EHU 12.23, Hume states that the only tendency that the Pyrrhonian arguments can have is to 
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show 'the whimsical condition of mankind.' We must act, reason, and believe although we 
cannot found these operations upon any certain basis (or refute the arguments against them). 
The natural reading of this passage is that it also alludes to the belief in the existence of Real 
entities. This is therefore an involuntary, uncertain belief against which there are irrefutable 
arguments.
In a familiar passage in An Abstract of a Book lately published, entitled. A Treatise of  
Human Nature (Hereafter: Abstract), Hume concludes that nature always overcomes 
Pyrrhonism and compels us to assent to external existence (Abs.27).12 Equally famously, he 
begins his explanation of the belief in Direct Realism in the Treatise by asserting that '’tis in 
vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in 
all our reasonings. (T 1.4.2.1)' The sceptic
'must assent to the principle concerning the existence of body, tho’ he cannot pretend by any arguments 
of philosophy to maintain its veracity. Nature has not left this to his choice, and has doubtless, esteem’d 
it an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and speculations. (T 1.4.2.1)'
Despite the fact that Hume expresses doubts about this statement in the penultimate 
paragraph of the Section, he finishes it with the following affirmation:
'For this reason I rely entirely upon them [the senses]; and take it for granted, whatever may be the 
reader’s opinion at this present moment, that an hour hence he will be perswaded there is both an 
external and internal world. (T 1.4.2.57)'
Between these, Hume also writes that even philosophers have 'so great a propensity to 
believe' in Realism that faced with the non-Reality of perceptions, they invent Representative 
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Realism (T 1.4.2.56; see also 50).
Finally, just before proclaiming the whimsical condition of mankind, Hume writes that 
'[n]ature is always too strong for principle. (EHU 12.23)' This formulation is reminiscent of 
the well-known passage in the Abstract. The same point is also made when Hume discusses 
the second 'species' of Academical philosophy in EHU 12.25:
'To bring us to so salutary a determination [Academical philosophy], nothing can be more serviceable, 
than to be once thoroughly convinced of […] the impossibility, that any thing, but the strong power of 
natural instinct, could free us from it [Pyrrhonism].'
All these passages suggest that the natural causes of the belief in Real entities are 
psychologically so strong that the belief cannot be permanently suspended or rejected. In 
some of them, Hume also appears to claim that he takes it as an unfounded, fundamental 
belief. Its logical and epistemological status seems to be then that of an axiom, which we take 
for granted.
Considering all these passages at the same time, is it possible to avoid concluding that 
Hume believes firmly in the existence of Real entities? Even a detailed analysis of these 
passages, perhaps revealing subtle differences between them, would not suffice to eliminate 
them completely. As a minimum, Hume believes that the natural instinct behind the belief in 
Realism is psychologically compelling, rendering perpetual resistance to it psychologically 
impossible. Hume's philosophy is naturalist in this respect at least.
3.3 Realist Interpretations
The strength of the Realist interpretations comes from Hume’s avowals of Realism, 
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such as the involuntariness passages. The problem they face is what to do with the sceptical 
arguments that are equally or even more present in Hume's works.
The naturalist strategy to avoid this problem is to insist that the point of Hume's 
scepticism is rather to support or bring about naturalism than to argue for a sceptical or 
negatively dogmatic position. Kemp Smith thinks that the sceptical arguments are ground-
clearing for naturalism, showing a 'mistaken endeavour of reason.' (2005, 116-21, 124-7 and 
129-32) Garrett thinks that they result from Hume's initial naturalism, his cognitive 
psychology. In the end, however, Hume reaches a stable naturalist position and the sceptical 
challenge is overcome when reason mixes suitably with sentiment. (Garrett 1997, 89-90)
Wright's and Strawson's solution is to claim that even after the strongest sceptical 
arguments have done their work, there is room for Hume to be a Realist. Wright’s strategy 
turns on what he calls 'inconceivable suppositions.' Even after the sceptical arguments that 
Hume presents, Wright suggests, it is possible for Hume to believe13 in the existence of Real 
matter and bodies as having only primary qualities by virtue of supposing their existence as 
such – despite the fact that, strictly taken, entities of that kind are inconceivable or their 
notion even inconsistent. (Wright 1995, 226-7, 231-4, and 1983, 107-12) Strawson’s move is 
to interpret Hume’s theory of ideas as accommodating 'relative ideas.' Although it is not 
possible to conceive of Real entities in terms of descriptively contentful positive perceptions 
(impressions and their copies, ideas), we can suppose their existence as distinguished from 
other entities in virtue of relative ideas. The relative idea of Real entities is an idea of 
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imperceptible beings (some unknown 'X') causing our sense-impressions. It is this relative 
idea that provides content for the belief in the existence of Real entities, despite the fact that it 
does not give any contentful insight into their properties and nature. (Strawson 2002, 231-58, 
239-42, and 1989, 49-53)
According to the dialectic readings, the sceptical arguments that Hume presents are not 
really arguments but form a dialectic which ends up with a belief in Real entities.
My objection to these Realist interpretations is that in the end they cannot evade the 
sceptical element in Hume's thought. Usually the discussion of scepticism with regard to the 
senses is restricted to the first profound argument against the senses (EHU 12.7-14 and 16) or 
T 1.4.2. This argument, concluding with the epistemically unjustified status of the belief in 
Real entities, is still quite compatible with the naturalist and New Humean interpretations. 
The real problem, however, lies in the second profound argument in the first Enquiry and Of 
the modern philosophy in the Treatise (1.4.4). It is these arguments of Hume that are not 
compatible with the Realist interpretation of his thinking.
First, these arguments advocate scepticism concerning comprehensibility instead of 
justification. The belief in the existence of Real entities is not merely epistemically 
unjustified; the very notion of Real entities is incomprehensible to the human mind. If this is 
not yet enough, the most severe problem for the Realist interpretations lies in the next point. 
Mainly because of the incomprehensibility of Real entities, according to these arguments of 
Hume, using what he considers to be the faculty of reason consistently results in an attitude 
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that is contradictory to believing in the existence of Real entities. Realist interpretations want 
to attribute both these principles – the proper exercise of the Humean conception of reason 
and Realism – to Hume. They thus render him an inconsistent philosopher. What is more, 
they make him self-consciously inconsistent because Hume thinks that assent to these two 
principles results in a contradiction. This I consider to be a decisive objection to any Realist 
interpretation of Hume proposed so far.
What is the contradiction at issue and why does it follow from the principle of the 
proper exercise of Humean reason? I discuss these questions in detail in the next section, but 
something can be said here, starting with the latter question. The second profound argument 
against the senses combines the results of two operations of Humean reason and two of its 
principles. The first operation is analysing the perceptions of extension and its modifications 
or 'primary qualities' that Real entities must have because they are by definition external to 
the mind. The second operation is drawing inductive-causal conclusions about the ontological 
status of 'secondary qualities', or what I think are more properly called proper sensibles. 
Proper sensibles are qualitative properties that are the immediate objects of perception of 
each particular sense. The two principles of Humean reason relevant here are two 
requirements of rationality: (1) rational beliefs must have comprehensible content, and (2) 
rational persons are consistent, that is, they do in fact follow at least one rational norm from 
'ought' to 'is.'
According to Hume, following these two principles of Humean reason and pursuing 
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these two of its operations results in withdrawing from the belief in the existence of Real 
entities. This is therefore the rational attitude to Realism in Hume’s view. If it is assumed, for 
the sake of the argument, that the belief in Realism is held simultaneously, we have a 
contradiction at hand. It is in fact contradictory to believe and not to believe in the same 
object at the same time. The contradiction arising from the conclusion of the second profound 
argument is thus between simultaneously believing in the existence of Real entities (material 
substance, for instance) and not holding that belief.
3.4 The Second Profound Argument against the Senses
That this is the correct description of the second profound argument and that it is really 
Hume's own argument require justification. Within the limits of this paper, it is not possible 
to go into the extensive discussion that would be necessary for justifying these two 
affirmations in full. I have done it in another place (Hakkarainen 2007, chaps. 3.4 and 4.2.2). 
Yet the argument and reasons for Hume's endorsement of it can be outlined briefly.
My reconstruction of the second profound argument (as a sequence of propositions) is 
the following:
-14-
(1) Our perceptions of all primary qualities other than extension are perceptions of extension [because they 
involve extension].
(2) Our perceptions of extension are perceptions of proper sensibles [Hume's theory of the perceptions of 
extension in T 1.2].
(3) Every perception of primary qualities is a perception of proper sensibles [from 1-2].
(4) Perceptions of primary qualities are the only candidates for perceptions that resemble the Real 
properties of Real entities (matter and bodies).14
(5) The Proper Sensibles Principle (PSP): perceptions of proper sensibles do not resemble the Real 
properties of Real entities (matter and bodies).
(6) None of our perceptions resembles any Real property of Real entities (matter and bodies) [from 3-5].
(7) Humans comprehend only by means of perceptions.
(8) Entities without properties (bare entities) are incomprehensible.
(9) Real entities (matter and bodies) are incomprehensible [from 6-8].
(10) The PSP is an inductive-causally rational tenet.
(11) The rest of the premises (1-9) is a matter of the analysis of perceptions.
(12) Humean reason, or the understanding, is the faculty of induction and the analysis of 
perceptions.
(13) The incomprehensibility of Real entities (matter and bodies) has been established by 
Humean reason [from 9-12].
(14) Rational beliefs must have comprehensible content.
(15) Rational persons ought not to believe in incomprehensible Real entities (matter and bodies) [from 14-
15].
(16) Rational persons are consistent in one respect at least: they follow the rational requirement of 
proposition (15).
(17) Rational persons do not believe in the existence of Real entities (matter and bodies) [from 15-16].
(18) It is contradictory to believe and not to believe at the same time.
(19) It is contradictory to be rational and to believe in the existence of Real entities (matter and bodies) at 
the same time [from 17-18].
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Steps (10) to (19), and especially (10) to (13), may appear strange because proposition 
(9) seems to be already established and what is established is a product of reason. However, 
these steps are necessary for reconstructing the second profound argument accurately and for 
my argument against the Realist Hume interpretations. Hume's formulations of the 
conclusion of the argument show that he takes the conclusion to concern the rational attitude 
to the existence of Real entities (EHU 12.16, T 1.4.4.15, and 1.4.7.4). Propositions (10) to 
(17) make explicit what in Hume's view follows from the incomprehensibility of Real entities 
regarding the rational attitude to their existence. First it is necessary to establish that the 
incomprehensibility of Real entities really is something that results from the proper exercise 
of the Humean conception of reason. Propositions (10) to (13) form therefore a meta 
argument with regard to the line of reasoning of (1) to (9). They are meant to show that we 
are not entitled to deny that Hume really endorses the second profound argument on the basis 
of the supposition that it relies on a non-Humean conception of reason. The next phase from 
(14) to (17) establishes what is the rational attitude to the existence of incomprehensible Real 
entities: withdrawal of assent to their existence. On the basis of this result, we can see that the 
final conclusion of the second profound argument is that, according to Hume, it is 
contradictory to be rational and a Realist at the same time.
If it is asked why the rational attitude to Realism is suspension instead of denying, it 
may be answered that Hume's text in EHU 12.15-6 does not support denial. Besides, it is 
rather dubious whether the vacuousness of the notion of a type of entities justifies believing 
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that they do not exist (let alone the assertion that their existence is impossible). How can we 
know or even understand what we are denying if the object of the denial transcends the 
boundaries of our comprehension?
The controversial points of Hume’s endorsement of the second profound argument are 
premises (7), (10), (14), and the step from (15) and (16) to (17).15 For instance, Strawson 
thinks that in Hume’s view, comprehension is not exhausted by positive perceptions 
(impressions and their copies, ideas) and hence Hume's commitment to premise (7) is 
dubious. There are also 'relative ideas' in virtue of which it is possible to grasp imperceptible 
entities. (Strawson 2002, 239-40) Garrett’s main objection to the claim that Hume fully 
endorses the Proper Sensibles Principle (10), or adopts it as his own, is that he does not ever 
speak about it as his own principle (1997, 220). Wright claims that not all Humean rational 
beliefs have comprehensible content (14) because sometimes there are good reasons to 
believe in inconceivable or even inconsistent suppositions. According to Wright, the 
supposition of Real matter and bodies with only primary qualities is of this kind: it is 
inconsistent and incomprehensible but still based on 'a systematic application of the principle 
of cause and effect.' (Wright 1995, 232) Finally (15 to 17), the standard naturalist point is that 
our psychology does not necessarily follow rational norms: consistency may require us not to 
believe in the existence of Real entities, but it does not follow that rational persons do in fact 
refrain from holding this belief. In Hume’s view, we fail to follow these rational norms 
because it is psychologically impossible for us to refrain permanently from believing in the 
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existence of Real entities.
To cut a long story very short, my replies to these objections are the following. Against 
Strawson, the putative relative idea of Real matter and bodies is of that imperceptible X 
which causes sense-impressions about them. The problem with accepting this relative idea is 
that it is incompatible with Hume’s view of the ideas of relations. Hume takes the ideas of 
relations to be complex (T 1.1.4.7), and thus requires that in order to understand a relation, 
there must be a perception of both relata. However, in the case of the putative relative idea of 
Real matter and bodies, there cannot be any perception of the other relatum in the supposed 
causal relation (as Strawson himself acknowledges). Hence there cannot be any idea of the 
relation and therefore it is not possible to distinguish this alleged relative idea from one of its 
three components, the positive idea of the sense-impression. Thus, the putative relative idea 
collapses into its positive idea component.16 Even if it were admitted that the idea of this type 
of supposed causation is provided by the abstract idea of causation, this would not help.17 As 
the abstract idea of causation cannot be of this specific type of (possible) causation – it must 
be of some other specific type – the resulting relative idea of Real matter is indeterminate. So 
it is not determinate enough to single out any actually existing entity or type of entity. The 
best it can do perhaps is to pick out a possible entity or type of entities. Besides, it is not even 
certain that it can single out a determinate type of possible entities – it may pick out, say, God 
instead of matter.18 The putative relative idea of matter cannot therefore be legitimate in 
Hume's view.19
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To Garrett, it may be replied that the textual evidence provides more support for the 
view that Hume does in fact assent to the inductive rationality of the PSP than it does for the 
supposition that he rejects it20 – and his endorsement of its rationality (11) is sufficient for his 
subscription to the argument. My answer to Wright is that Hume does not explicitly employ 
any inconceivable supposition to avoid the conclusion of the second profound argument. So 
there is no specific textual evidence for Wright's interpretation here. In the end, the basic 
naturalist objection may be rebutted by the point that the second profound argument does not 
require permanent refraining from the belief in Real entities. Domain-indexed suspension is 
sufficient and Hume does not rule that out (EHU 12.15.n.32, 12.21, 22 and 23).
Otherwise I think that Hume's endorsement of the premises of the argument is rather 
uncontroversial. It starts by analysing the perceptions of putative primary qualities in a 
manner that accords with Hume’s theory of the perception of extension in T 1.2. This 
analysis of perceptions is thus also a product of the consistent use of Humean reason or 
understanding. It is also a reasonable assumption that Hume thinks that bare entities are 
incomprehensible (especially when the alleged relative idea of Real matter is not legitimate in 
his view and his rejection of substratum in T 1.4.3) and simultaneous belief and non-belief 
are contradictory. Thus, if my account of the second profound argument is correct and if my 
replies to the objections are successful, it is indeed the case that this reasoning is Hume’s own 
argument.21 Nor is there any textual evidence against it being so. Hume's sole comments on 
the argument only support the view that he endorses it:
'admit[s] of no answer. (EHU 12.15.n.32)'
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'they [human beings] are not able, by their most diligent enquiry, [...] to remove objections, which may 
be raised against them [Realism and inductive inference]. (EHU 12.23)'
For the Realist interpretations of Hume, this result causes grave problems. If they 
attribute both the consistent use of inductive, perception-analytical reason and Realism to 
him, according to this argument of Hume, they saddle him with 'a manifest contradiction. (T 
1.4.7.4)'
3.5 No Single-Hume Interpretations
I presume that the Realist interpretations are not intended to render Hume inconsistent. 
Showing that they do would thus be a sufficient objection to these readings in their own right. 
Yet I think Hume's attitude to the contradiction between Realism and the proper use of reason 
should be considered.
First, attributing the contradiction to Hume would not be a problem perhaps if he 
accepted it with 'carelessness.' However, there are two reasons not to think that he does so. 
First, there is a fair amount of textual evidence that in general he does not accept 
contradictions in philosophy.22 Secondly, textual evidence points at the opposite direction 
with regard to this particular contradiction. In the first Enquiry, Hume states that the second 
profound argument is 'derived from the most profound philosophy' and 'goes farther' than the 
first (EHU 12.15 and 16). As we have seen, he thinks that it is irrefutable (admits of no 
answer). The strongest evidence that Hume’s attitude to the contradiction is serious rather 
than careless can be nevertheless found in the Conclusion of Treatise 1:
'Or in case we prefer neither of them [belief in Realism and consistent reasoning], but successively assent 
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to both, as is usual among philosophers, with what confidence can we afterwards usurp that glorious title, 
when we thus knowingly embrace a manifest contradiction? 
This contradiction wou’d be more excusable, were it compensated by any degree of solidity and 
satisfaction in the other parts of our reasoning. But the case is quite contrary. (T 1.4.7.4-5)'23
Secondly, there is the possibility that Hume thinks that this is just how things are. 
Philosophers cannot help but to be inconsistent even if they should not be; they must both 
believe in the existence of Real entities and reason consistently. The former is 
psychologically necessary and the latter what they ought to do as philosophers. The moral of 
the second profound argument would be that this is the human and philosophical condition.
Yet I think we should look for something better, i.e. a solution that allows Hume to 
avoid philosophical self-contradiction. In this respect, the no-single-Hume interpretations 
seem most promising. Without the threat of the contradiction, as I explain below, they can 
claim that Hume endorses both the existence of Real entities and proper exercise of reason 
because of the temporal, perspectival, attitude, or domain distinctions these accounts attribute 
to them. The no-single-Hume interpretations are not in tension with the first profound 
argument either, according to which the belief in the existence of Real entities is unjustified. 
In general, they do not have difficulty explaining the sceptical arguments that are present in 
Hume’s works.
The question is then which no-single-Hume interpretation ought to be preferred. Let us 
first consider the merits and downsides of Popkin’s, Fogelin’s and Baxter’s interpretations.
Popkin maintains (1980, 103) that Hume is 'the only 'consistent Pyrrhonian' sceptic.' In 
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the case of our main question, this means that at one time Hume suspends his judgement on 
the existence of Real entities; at another, he firmly believes in them. According to Popkin, 
Hume is both a sceptic and a positive dogmatist on the issue. When he is in his rational 
'mood', by means of irrefutable sceptical arguments he comes to the conclusion that we ought 
to suspend our belief in Real entities. (Ibid. 112-5, 119-20, 126, 130 and 132) This belief 
cannot have any rational basis and it involves insolvable paradoxes (Ibid. 112 and 119-20).
Despite the fact that the rational mood is natural for philosophers (Ibid. 123 and 131), it 
is in the strong natural mood that Hume is a Realist. In this respect, Popkin repeats the basic 
naturalistic claim that our instincts force us to be Realists notwithstanding the irrefutable 
sceptical arguments (Ibid. 116, 119-20 and 123-6). Hume is the only consistent Pyrrhonist 
because he does only what nature compels him to do. In their lives, the ancient Pyrrhonists 
followed nature in the form of appearances – what seemed to them to be the case – but 
suspended judgement on the question of how things really are. Hume follows nature more 
consistently as he believes firmly when nature necessitates him to do so. Actually, Popkin 
goes so far as to claim that Hume believes only what nature makes him believe. (Ibid. 126-30 
and 132)
Another circumstance with respect to which Hume is also a consistent Pyrrhonist is that 
since he does not suspend judgement and believe at the same time, but only during different 
periods of time, he is not subject to any contradiction.
The problem with Popkin's reading is that it is trivial or too simplistic. If it is meant to 
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point out that Hume is a determinist and thus the workings of the understanding are also 
completely determined by their causes, it is trivial (provided that Hume is a determinist). If 
Popkin's intention is that there is no room for free, self-reflective belief-formation based on 
evidence, the picture he draws about Hume is too simplistic. Hume clearly allows and 
endorses this kind of belief-formation. The best examples of it are his two famous statements 
in the first Enquiry:
'A wise man proportions [...] his belief to the evidence. (EHU 10.4)'
'philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life, methodized and corrected. (EHU 
12.25)'24
In his latest Hume article, which is a comment on Garrett’s book, Fogelin defends a 
form of no-single-Hume interpretation. Actually, in his book of 1985, he already 
acknowledges his debt to Popkin and there are also hints of this kind of reading in both that 
book and a 1993 article (1985, xii, 149-50, and 1993, 113). However, it is only in the latest 
paper on this topic that he explicitly maintains a no-single-Hume reading. Fogelin’s more 
mature view is that Hume is a 'radical perspectivist': his writings exhibit inconsistent 
positions depending on the perspective from which things are considered (1998, 164-7).25 I 
interpret this to mean the following. Since no perspective is preferable to another (they are on 
a par in this respect), Hume does not have any final philosophical position on any issue; he 
merely has judgements depending on the perspective. From one point of view, Hume is a 
Realist; from another, he is not.
I will not go into the details of Fogelin’s new interpretation. Suffice it to note two 
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things. First, Fogelin does not attribute any contradiction to Hume’s philosophical positions 
because the inconsistent views are held from different perspectives (1998, 165-6). Secondly 
and relatedly, Fogelin also reads Hume as the first philosopher doing the 'natural history of 
philosophy.' (Ibid. 168) This means that especially with regard to Real entities and perceiving 
them with our senses, Hume’s account should be taken as 'a sequence of philosophical 
perspectives', which unfold naturally when one is doing philosophy in 'an unrestricted 
manner.' (Ibid.)26
Fogelin can be criticised from the point of view of what Hume does in the first Enquiry. 
He does not merely proceed from one standpoint to another. With regard to induction, 
causality, miracles and scepticism at least, he has a clear intention to establish a final, 
considered position. Amid the various sceptical positions that he discusses, it is Academical 
philosophy that he endorses. Fogelin’s later reading is therefore not convincing in the light of 
Hume's mature work on the understanding.
Recently, Baxter has deliberately followed in Popkin’s footsteps and defended the view 
that Hume is a Pyrrhonist regarding the existence of Real entities. Baxter’s interesting claim 
is that Hume’s various remarks on the issue are best accounted for by making a subtle 
distinction between two kinds of assent. Baxter thinks that in this regard, Hume models 
himself on Sextus Empiricus who, according to Popkin and Michael Frede, distinguishes 
active endorsement from passive assent. (Baxter 2006, 115-6)
Applied to the case of Real entities, this means the following. On the one hand, Hume 
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suspends his active assent to their existence since it is epistemically unjustified – there are no 
reasons to support its truth. Actually, Baxter takes Hume to be a complete Pyrrhonist in this 
sense, suspending active endorsement of every belief due to the absence of reasons. However, 
on the other hand, Hume assents passively to the existence of Real entities because it is 
instinctive and almost irresistible. This passive endorsement is for Baxter then what the 
naturalistic interpretation takes as Humean, 'natural belief.' His contribution, which is close to 
Popkin, is to distinguish this following of natural impulses from the philosophical 
endorsement. The relevant point here, as in Popkin and Fogelin’s latest interpretation, is that 
this is a way to avoid attributing any inconsistency to Hume. (2006, 114-7) As Baxter 
concisely puts it, '[i]n this sceptical way Hume takes for granted the existence of body.' (Ibid. 
116)
Baxter’s interpretation suffers from the same problem as Fogelin’s radically 
perspectivist account: it is at odds with Hume’s mature works. In the first place, Baxter also 
claims that Hume is a Pyrrhonist in the sense that he suspends his active, i.e. rational assent 
universally. The problem with this interpretation is that one of Hume's key points in EHU 12 
is that he is not a Pyrrhonist in this sense (EHU 12.23-5). Besides, I think it is clear from 
Hume's mature works that he does not suspend all rational (active) assent; consider Hume's 
endorsement of proper inductive inferences, for instance.27
In the second place, Baxter's interpretation is not grounded in any distinction explicitly 
put forward by Hume – especially if more emphasis is put again on Hume's mature works 
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instead of his 'juvenile' Treatise. Although we may find the distinction between passive and 
active assent in Sextus Empiricus – if Popkin and Frede are right – Hume does not employ it 
explicitly anywhere. Hume's distinction between 'the sensitive' and 'the cogitative part of our 
natures' (T 1.4.1.8) is perhaps closest, but even this distinction disappears completely in 
Hume's mature works. Baxter is therefore going in the right direction, but his interpretation is 
too radical and there is no positive textual support for the specific distinction on which it is 
based; in this respect it is non-Humean.
4. Sceptical and Realist Interpretation
Instead, it is typical for Hume to make a distinction between everyday life and 
philosophy in its various forms.28 Crucially, as I show below, in his mature works, Hume 
draws this distinction in the context of sceptical arguments, concerning both Realism and 
inductive inference. By contrast to Baxter’s distinction of assents, therefore, we have good 
grounds for appealing to this distinction in the resolution of the problem that the second 
profound argument creates.
Hume employs different terms for philosophy and common life. In the essay Of Essay-
Writing, they are 'Worlds', 'Countries', 'Dominions', and what Hume calls the 'conversible' 
part of everyday life is characterised even as 'the Empire of Conversation' and philosophy as 
'the Republic of Letters. (E, EW, 533 and 535)' In the first Enquiry, he uses 'sphere' for the 
realm of philosophy (EHU 12.22). So I think that it is justified to use 'sphere' and two of its 
synonyms in this connection, although Hume does not use the terms 'domain' and 'realm' 
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anywhere in his works. Hume's division between philosophy and everyday life can be thus 
described as the distinction between the domains, realms or spheres of philosophy and 
everyday life.
Hume understands this division as rather an epistemological than an ontological 
distinction. His point is not to draw a strict ontological divide between philosophy and 
everyday life as distinct entities. Even the philosopher who engages in the most abstract 
thinking is a plain man, too (EHU 1.6, T 1.4.2.36 and DNR 1.9). Philosophy is also in an 
intimate constructive interplay with everyday life, as Hume's two famous slogans state: 
philosophical decisions are only corrected and methodized reflections of common life (EHU 
12.25; quoted above), and philosophical arguments are exacter and more careful instances of 
the same kind as everyday reasonings:
'everyone, even in common life, is constrained to have more or less of this philosophy; that from our 
earlies infancy we make continual advances in forming more general principles of conduct and 
reasoning; that the larger experience we acquire, and the stronger reason we are endowed with, we 
always render our principles the more general and comprehensive; and that what we call philosophy is 
nothing but a more regular and methodical operation of the same kind. To philosophize on such subjects 
is nothing essentially different from reasoning on common life; and we may only expect greater stability, 
if not greater truth, from our philosophy, on account of its exacter and more scrupulous method of 
proceeding.' (DNR 1.9; see also E, EW, 535).
The ground of Hume's distinction is thus in the relevant epistemic standards. The same 
rational capacities, notably inductive inference, are employed in both the domain of 
philosophy and the sphere of everyday life. The difference between these two domains 
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consists in the point that, as Hume says, in the philosophical domain the same rational 
capacities are followed in a more rigorous and systematic manner. The epistemic standards in 
philosophy are thus stricter than those that apply in everyday life: contradictions, for instance, 
are not permitted.29 It should be pointed out, however, that even this distinction between 
epistemic standards is rather a difference in degree than in kind. In this respect, it is in 
principle possible for a common man to become a philosopher because he already possesses 
the needed rational capacities.
Since the Humean distinction on which this interpretation is based allows interaction 
between philosophy and common life, it does not suffer from a further problem in Baxter's 
account. It is hard to see how Baxter's active endorsement and passive assent are able to 
interact and to result from the same kind of rational capacity. In this respect as well, it is 
therefore preferable to use Hume's own distinction between philosophy and common life 
rather than Baxter's distinction from Sextus.
By distinguishing the attitude that Hume takes in the philosophical domain from his 
opinion within the realm of common life, it is possible to construct a satisfactory no-single-
Hume interpretation. The basic idea in this reading is that in the domain of philosophy, Hume 
suspends his judgement on the existence of Real entities, whereas within the realm of 
everyday life he firmly believes in them. Or to put it more directly, Hume the philosopher is a 
sceptic and Hume the common man is a positive dogmatist with regard to Realism.30 This 
account is able to avoid attributing the contradiction between rational withdrawal of assent to 
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Realism and simultaneous holding of that belief because of the different domains within 
which these attitudes are held: they are domain-indexed.31
The distinction involved in my no-single-Hume interpretation differs subtly from the 
distinction used in the three other no-single-Hume readings. In Popkin's account, Hume holds 
different attitudes to the same object, Realism, in distinct moments of time, while I think that 
he holds these attitudes in distinct domains and I do not take any stance on the temporal 
relations between the attitudes.32 Baxter differs from me in drawing the distinction between 
the two kinds of assent to Realism and suspending the one while holding the other. According 
to my account, it is the same kind of assent that is suspended in the philosophical domain and 
entertained in the realm of everyday life. It is Fogelin's distinction of perspectives that is 
closest to mine. Actually, Fogelin does not say enough about perspectives for an exact 
description of the difference between his distinction between perspectives and my domain 
distinction. Formally, it is that according to Fogelin, Hume makes statements from different 
perspectives, whereas I think that he takes different attitudes in different domains. However, 
although our views come formally close to each other, they differ substantially. My view is 
that Hume may have preferences between the two domains.33 Domains are spheres of belief-
formation or cognitive commitment with different epistemic standards. For Fogelin, 
perspectives are in principle non-preferable, but he does not say what they are.
I think we should not go too far in comparing my interpretation of Hume with some 
contemporary trends in epistemology. Hume just does not say enough for constructing so 
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detailed interpretation that could match up with the detailed, technical discussion nowadays. 
As an interpretation, that would be textually unjustified. Besides, there is no room for that 
kind of discussion in this paper, which has to take on the competing Hume interpretations.
However, something can be said briefly here. According to John Hawthorne's and Jason 
Stanley's Subject Sensitive Invariantism (SSI), the content of the knowledge relation between 
a subject and a proposition is invariable. Whether it obtains is sensitive to the subject's 
practical interests, goals and presuppositions. The basic idea in its rival, Epistemic 
Contextualism (EC), defended by Keith DeRose and Stewart Cohen, for example, is that the 
content of the knowledge relation varies. It does not do so in relation to the subject's situation 
but to the context of conversant participants or knowledge attributers. This context 
determines relevant epistemic standards and depends on the participants' interests and 
presuppositions.34
My Hume interpretation is closer to SSI than to EC. If we put it in the contemporary 
terminology, doxastic relations such as 'knows' are invariant in their content: it is the same 
kind of attitude that is suspended and held in the different domains. Its obtaining depends on 
the epistemic standards of the subject's domain, not on the context of the knowledge 
attributers (to the subject). This is similar to SSI and clearly different from EC. There is 
nevertheless a difference between my interpretation and SSI: in the philosophical domain, the 
epistemic standard is not practicality but philosophical virtues like consistency. The 
practicality of the standards in everyday life is quite much like the subject's practical interests 
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and goals in SSI though.
All in all, when every circumstance I have identified is taken into consideration, this 
reading of Hume as a philosophical sceptic and an everyday positive dogmatist is the most 
satisfactory of those proposed so far.
(1) Among the four principal interpretations, it avoids the problem of the negatively 
dogmatic reading having no textual support. It has the same advantage as the mere sceptical 
interpretation having textual justification. The first point to be noted of this is that Hume says 
explicitly that his Academical philosophy involves suspension of judgement:
'The academics always talk of doubt and suspense of judgment. (EHU 5.1)'
In this light, it is reasonable to read Hume’s use of 'doubt' as referring also to suspension in 
the corresponding passage in Section 12:
'In general, there is a degree of doubt, and caution, and modesty, which, in all kinds of scrutiny and 
decision, ought for ever to accompany a just reasoner. (EHU 12.24)'
Of course, these passages speak about or indicate suspension of judgement in general 
instead of the specific suspension of belief in the existence of Real entities. However, 
precisely because the import of the passages is general, the reading that Hume’s Academical 
philosophy, his philosophical position, involves suspension of judgement on the existence of 
Real entities is consistent with them.
Besides, one of Hume's few comments on the second profound argument is that it 
'produce[s] no conviction. (EHU 12.15.n.32)' Although there might be other reasonable 
readings of this passage, it fits nicely with the conclusion of the second profound argument – 
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not believing in Real entities – and with Hume's philosophical position involving suspension 
of belief. Suspension is non-conviction. It also matches up perfectly with the general 
characteristic of Pyrrhonian arguments that they are intended to produce epochê, suspension 
of judgement and belief. Hume says in the footnote that it is the general sign of 'merely 
sceptical' arguments.
Against this interpretation, it might be asked why Hume does not bring his solution to 
the second profound argument forward if he has one. Hume is almost completely silent on his 
attitude to the two profound arguments in EHU 12. He presents them, refutes Pyrrhonism, 
and proceeds to Academical philosophy, which can be, in part, the result of Pyrrhonism. 
Nevertheless, here I would like to ask the reader to reflect on the very fact that Hume is 
silent. Which one of the interpretations of his philosophical position does his silence support 
more: suspension, affirming, or denying? If Hume the philosopher believes in the existence 
of Real entities, why does not he say it? Likewise, if he denies their existence, why does not 
he say so? But clearly his silence fits quite nicely with suspension of judgement. If one 
suspends his judgement on a problem, he may say so aloud. However, it is equally reasonable 
to express his attitude, or more precisely, his omission by keeping silent. Hume’s silence 
therefore supports the sceptical rather than dogmatic readings of his philosophical position. 
And it may surprise the proponents of the Realist interpretation to notice that Hume’s 
Academical philosophy does not involve any expressed commitment to Realism.
(2) My no-single-Hume interpretation does not suffer from the difficulty of the mere 
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sceptical and negatively dogmatic interpretations in explaining an important aspect of 
Hume’s naturalism: the involuntariness passages; on the contrary, they can be incorporated 
into it. It can take advantage of the support these passages provide for the Realist readings, 
since it agrees that Hume is a Realist in common life. It also fits well with Hume’s point in 
the involuntariness passages: when we do not reflect on the issue, the belief in the existence 
of Real entities returns.
(3) This no-single-Hume interpretation can also deal with the sceptical arguments 
against the senses that Hume advances. The result of the first profound argument against the 
senses is that the belief in Realism is epistemically unjustified and this result supports my 
claim about Hume's philosophical view. By contrast to the Realist readings, the second 
profound argument does not create any problem for it either. Hume's attitude in the domain of 
philosophy is to suspend his judgement on the existence of Real entities mainly because Real 
entities are beyond the reach of our understanding (second argument). The most significant 
advantage of my account in comparison with the Realist readings is nonetheless that it does 
not assign the conclusion of the second profound argument, the self-conscious contradiction, 
to Hume; the contradictory attitudes of suspension and assent are entertained in different 
domains.35 Yet my interpretation does not commit Hume to a Pyrrhonist universal suspension 
of belief because thus interpreted, suspension is restricted: it concerns only one belief and is 
domain-indexed. Hume the philosopher can easily deny then that universal suspension of 
belief as the mental effect of the arguments is lasting as he does (EHU 12.2, 15.n.32, 21, 23 
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and 25).
(4) My no-single-Hume interpretation steers away from the problems involved in 
Popkin’s and Fogelin’s no-single-Hume accounts. It is neither trivial nor draws too a 
simplistic picture of belief-formation in Hume's view, on the one hand, and makes it possible 
that Hume has a final philosophical position, on the other. It allows Hume to have serious 
theoretical ambitions – which he has – because suspension of judgement concerns only one 
philosophical topic. It is preferable to Baxter’s account for three reasons. (1) It does not 
render Hume a Pyrrhonist who suspends all rational assent. (2) It is founded upon a Humean 
distinction and (3) is coherent with Hume's view that philosophical arguments interact with 
and are of the same type as common life reasonings.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, I have defended the interpretation that Hume is both a sceptic and a 
positive dogmatist on the existence of Real entities. To put it in contemporary terms, he is 
both a non-Realist and a Realist. Scepticism or non-Realism is his position in the 
philosophical domain, whereas his everyday view is (philosophically speaking) positive 
dogmatism: a firm belief that there are Real entities.
In early modern philosophy, corporeal substance, individual bodies and their causal 
powers are paradigm cases of Real entities. From this no-single-Hume interpretation it 
follows that Hume's position in the domain of philosophy does not involve any standpoint 
concerning their existence. Hume’s philosophy of body, if he has any, must be non-Realist: 
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on his view, matter and bodies are not perception-independent. Hume's philosophical position 
can therefore be neither materialism nor mind-body dualism.
Also, if my interpretation is correct, it is not possible that Hume's philosophical 
ontological commitments involve anything Real that would ground causation as regularity 
between events. It is not consistent to avoid commitment to the existence of a category of 
possible entities in any sense of commitment and to commit oneself to the existence of a sub-
category of these entities at the same time. This casts a shadow over the much debated New 
Humean interpretation of Hume's view on causation. Indeed, if my interpretation is correct, 
its Causally Realist (perhaps not agnostic or sceptical36) forms are refuted.37
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1 Following Michael J. Loux (2002, 250), in order to distinguish Metaphysical Realism and Metaphysically Real 
entities from the other uses of ‘realism’ and ‘real’ (and its cognates), I write the former with the capital ‘r’. For the sake of 
brevity, I will henceforth drop 'Metaphysical.'
2 All references to the first Enquiry are to Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, edited by T. L. 
Beauchamp (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000). All references to the Treatise are to Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 
edited by D. F. Norton and M. J. Norton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007). Both will be cited by a series of Arabic numerals: 
four in the case of the Treatise (book, chapter, section, paragraph) and two in the case of the Enquiry (section and 
paragraph).
3 The Humean understanding of Realism requires three remarks of clarification.
In the first place, I would like to emphasise that it is precisely this definition that begins Hume's discussion of 
external existence both in the first Enquiry and the Treatise. As this definition of Realism is highly abstracted, there can be 
several specific descriptions of Real entities. In principle, it is also possible that there are more than one kind of these 
entities (e.g. matter, God). This paper discusses Hume's attitude to the existence of Real entities on this level of abstraction. 
Thus, I do not have to discuss his following two distinctions: (1) distinguishing Real entities as 'specifically different from 
our perceptions' from Real entities as not specifically different from perceptions (T 1.2.6.9, 1.4.2.2 and 1.4.5.19-20), and (2) 
the distinction between the 'vulgar' and different philosophical accounts of Real entities in EHU 12.9-14 and T 1.4.2 
(Representative Realism) and EHU 12.15 and T 1.4.4 (Real entities having only primary qualities). As Hume's discussion in 
both the works clearly indicates, all these may be thought to fall (right or wrong) into the category of Real entities. Besides, 
the talk about objects 'specifically different from our perceptions' vanishes from the first Enquiry.
In the second place, Hume must make the distinction between ontological and causal perception-
independence/dependence: between existence depending on perceptions and perceiving affecting properties. Otherwise we 
cannot make sense of a curious aspect of Hume's discussion in T 1.4.2: it is consistent to think that perceptions are 
independent existences but it is a gross mistake to take them as such (T 1.4.2.39 and 44-5). If we make the distinction 
between ontological and causal independence/dependence, this apparent contradiction is avoided: perceptions are 
ontologically independent but causally dependent entities. It is Hume's reason for denying that perceptions are Real that 
they are causally dependent on perceiving, i.e. the process of perception affects their content (T 1.4.2.44-5). From this we 
can conclude regarding Real entities that according to Hume they must be both ontologically and causally perception-
independent, i.e. perceiving does not affect their properties. This is confirmed by the fact that in the Treatise, Hume 
explicitly distinguishes ontological independence from operational, i.e. causal independence: 'Under this last head I 
comprehend their situation as well as relations, their external position as well as the independence of their existence and 
operation. (T 1.4.2.2)'
In the third place, the Humean definition of Realism involves externality in absolute as opposite to perception-
dependent space. Hume suggests this by the following formulation in the first Enquiry: 'an external universe, which depends 
not on out perception. (EHU 12.7)'
4 So I will speak not only about Real entities but sometimes also of 'Real matter, bodies, causes and powers' meaning 
material substance, individual bodies composed of it, and individual bodies as causes and powers.
5 The connection between Hume's attitude to Realism and the New Humean interpretation of Hume's view of 
causation is a complicated matter. Here there is no room for pursuing this question, but I will say something about it in the 
conclusion. For the summary of the New Hume debate, see Read and Richman 2007, Kail 2008, and Millican 2009.
6 My claim is restricted to Hume's view of Realism. I am not stating that the relation is same in the other parts of 
Hume’s philosophy such as his attitude to induction.
7 I would like to emphasise that none of the no-single-Hume interpretations is intended to imply that Hume was a 
split personality, that there were two really distinct persons/subjects in him. There was only one historical David Hume (at 
least there is no evidence for him being schizophrenic). But this Hume had different views in philosophy and common life.
8 The summary elaborates upon the reconstruction of the second profound argument against the senses that I defend 
in my dissertation, which is a published book. I analyse it in meticulous detail and present a structural diagram of it 
(Hakkarainen 2007, chap. 3.4).
9 A fine summary of this interpretation can be found in Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785), 
edited by Derek R. Brookes and Knud Haakonsen (Edinburgh, 2002), p. 162. For other references, see Kemp Smith 2005, 
3-8 and chap. IV, and Norton 1982, 3-5, 192, and 196-204. It was also endorsed by H.H. Price (1940, 227) in his otherwise 
more positive phenomenalist reading of Hume in the 1940s. Recently, Louis Loeb is amongst the few who has defended it 
as a side topic of his book (2002, viii and 215-6).
10 The exact description of the New Humean interpretation is not an easy task. This is exemplified by Peter Kail's 
characterisation as he includes the mere sceptical view in it. Yet he calls the mere sceptical view 'realist' because according 
to him it is committed to the comprehensibility and metaphysical possibility of causation as more than mere regularity 
('thick' connection, for example). This is understandable in the discussion over Hume's theory of causation because the 
context of the New Humeans is to oppose the anti-realist Old Humen account, according to which Hume denies causation as 
anything more than mere observed regularity. (Kail 2008, 442-3 and 450-1) However, we should keep the interpretations of 
Hume's view on causation and Causal Realism separate from interpreting his attitude to Realism in general because they are 
different although related issues. This has three significant consequences. (1) The different views about Hume on Realism 
should be primarily classified by what they say about Hume's doxastic attitude to the existence of Real entities (although 
this is connected to conceptual and semantic issues and related to Hume's view on causation). (2) In this categorisation, 
John P. Wright's, Strawson's and Kail's New Humean interpretations are Realist as they claim that Hume is committed – 
however weakly – to the existence of Real entities. This is manifested by their eagerness to argue against Hume's 
endorsement of the second profound argument as will be shown below. (3) The mere sceptical position on Realism should 
be called non-Realist because it does not involve any positive doxastic attitude to the existence of Real entities. Calling it 
'Realist' because it acknowledges the comprehensibility of what is suspended is not satisfactory. As this article shows, it is 
not necessary for suspending judgement on the existence of entity x that x can be understood. When its incomprehensibility 
(in the sense of vacuousness) is realised, a completely reasonable option is to suspend judgement, to be silent about its 
existence.
11 In Livingston's view, Hume takes the everyday belief in Real entities as a transcendental presupposition of our 
experience and reasoning (1984, 3 and 15). For Baier, Hume’s 'true philosophy' is the critical application and self-reflection 
of common life beliefs and reasonings including the belief in Real entities (1991, 20-7). Morris claims that Hume advocates 
a return to common life from the philosophical 'problem space' of 'modern philosophy.' Modern philosophy produces the 
hardest sceptical argument against the belief in Real entities, T 1.4.4, which corresponds to what I am calling the second 
profound argument. (Morris 2000, 108-9)
12 All references to the Abstract are to Hume, An Abstract of a Book lately published, entitled. A Treatise of Human 
Nature, &c. wherein the chief argument of that book is farther illustrated and explained (1740), A Treatise of Human 
Nature, edited by D. F. Norton and M. J. Norton (Oxford, 2007), pp. 403-417. Hume's Abstract is cited by Abs. and an 
Arabic numeral referring to paragraph.
13 The New Humean position may be formulated in the way that the doxastic propositional attitude to the existence 
of Real entities is weaker than belief. It may be supposing, taking for granted or assuming. (Kail 2008, 446) Anyhow, all of 
these are commitments to the existence of Real entities – even if the degree of the commitment varies. The point of my 
argument concerns ontological commitment. Thus, my argument against attributing the belief in Real entities can work 
against them, too. For the sake of brevity, I will speak only about belief.
14 Note that this premise concerns the comprehensible properties of Real entities (matter and bodies). In their set, 
perceptible primary qualities are the only candidates for the Real properties of matter. But matter may have 
incomprehensible properties in addition to primary qualities and proper sensibles. So the PSP alone does not imply the 
principle that matter has only primary qualities. The PSP is independent from the latter principle.
15 One of the virtues of this schematic reconstruction is thus that different positions and disagreements in the 
literature can be singled out nicely by its means.
16 I cannot argue this point fully here; for the present purposes, this will do. I have made a full case elsewhere 
(Hakkarainen 2007, 245-52). It might be also the case that Hume's two definitions of cause (EHU 7.29 and T 1.3.14.31) 
require that both relata of causation are perceptible. In Strawson's relative idea, the cause is not (in his own view). So it 
would not be permitted to employ causal concepts in describing it.
17 Garrett made me this comment in conversation.
18 These points originate in Winkler 2007 and Flage 2007.
19 In the paper, there is no room to discuss the possible textual evidence for this in EHU 12.9, 16, T 1.2.6.8-9 and 
1.4.5.19-20. I have argued elsewhere that these passage do not constitute sufficient evidence for ascribing the doctrine of the 
relative idea of Real matter to Hume (Hakkarainen 2007, 232-44).
20 EHU 1.14.n.1 (in 1748-50 editions), T 3.1.1.26, T 1.4.4.3-4, T 1.4.4.15, T 1.4.7.4, Essays, Moral, Political, and 
Literary (Hereafter: E), Of the Standard of Taste (Hereafter: ST), 234, 229-30, and E, The Sceptic (Hereafter: S), 166, n.3. 
All references to E are to Hume, Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary (1741 – 1777), edited by E. F. Miller (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 1987). Hume's Essays are cited by the abbreviation of the title of the essay and an Arabic number referring to 
page number. I have made a full case for this in Hakkarainen 2010.
21 Kail has suggested that what Garrett calls Hume's 'Title Principle' (1997, 234) provides Hume means for avoiding 
commitment to the second profound argument. Kail's tempting solution is that this argument is undermined by the Title 
Principle because in it reasoning does not mix with 'a natural propensity', which the Title Principle requires of authoritative 
reasonings (2007, 70). However, Kail's solution does not work for two reasons. First, there is no specific textual evidence 
for it. The Title Principle occurs only once in Hume's works (T 1.4.7.11). The context of this occurrence is Hume's answer 
to the Pyrrhonian moment (Ibid.8) created by scepticism with regard to reason (Ibid.7 and T 1.4.1). Hume does not bring it 
forward as a reply to T 1.4.4 and its recapitulation at 1.4.7.4-5. So Kail's solution suffers from insufficient textual evidence. 
Secondly, I have shown that Hume endorses all the premises of the second profound argument. Thus, it is not coherent for 
him to reject, because of the Title Principle, their conjunction, that is, the second profound argument (one cannot accept p 
and q but not their conjunction).
22 EHU 2.4, 3.16.n.6, 4.21, 5.10, 8.8, 8.36, 12.20, 12.n.34, T 1.1.5.8, 1.4.4.1, 1.4.5.1-2, 14, 1.4.6.2, 1.4.7.4-8, 
3.App.10 and 21
23 It is true that Hume says in this passage that the contradiction is generated by successive assent to the consistent 
use of reason and the belief in Realism. My reading of the passage is that he cannot mean that the contradiction holds 
diachronically. His point is rather that successive assent to the proper exercise of reason and the belief in Realism produces 
the contradiction between simultaneous suspension of this belief and holding it.
24 It is a different issue how this is possible if Hume is a fully-fledged determinist.
25 After this article was submitted and revised, Fogelin published a new book Hume's Skeptical Crisis – A Textual  
Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
26 For a detailed account, see Fogelin 1985, 80ff.
27 In order to avoid this problem, I think, in his book Baxter develops this interpretation in a direction that comes 
close to the naturalist interpretations and makes his reading vulnerable to the inconsistency problem. Now the Humean 
conception of reason, including induction, belongs to the passive assent as well as the belief in Realism (Baxter 2008, 9-14). 
What is more, both exemplify 'stable' passive assents, which Hume prefers to varying assents of the same kind (Ibid. 9). The 
active assent is the sphere of 'rationalist reason', 'an idealized kind of belief assumed by his opponents and by most of us. 
(Ibid. 101 and 9)' Baxter cannot thus distinguish the second profound argument from the belief in Realism as belonging to 
distinct kinds of assents. His interpretation is not therefore able to avoid the inconsistency problem between the two 
anymore. This is the reason why I focus on his earlier view.
28 EHU 4.21, 5.2, 12.5, 21, 23, 24, 25, T 1.4.2, intro.1-3, E, Of Essay-Writing (Hereafter: EW), 533-4, and 
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Hereafter: DNR) 1.9. All references to DNR are to Hume, Dialogues Concerning 
Natural Religion (1779), edited by D. Coleman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Hume's Dialogues is cited 
by DNR and two Arabic numerals referring to Part and paragraph.
29 Hume thinks that embracing some contradictions is not so serious in everyday life (T 1.4.7.7, EHU 4.21 and DNR 
1.10) .
30 I would like to emphasise that Realism is the philosophical analysis of the everyday belief. I am not ascribing to 
Hume the claim that everyday people are aware that they endorse the philosophical tenet of Realism or that it is identical in 
details with philosophical Realisms. This is completely coherent with how Hume himself discusses the issue (EHU 12.7-9, 
14, 16 and T 1.4.2).
31 The question how this distinction is supposed to work generally in Hume's thinking cannot be pursued here. I 
believe though that it is a fruitful perspective to many topics such as induction and personal identity.
32 In itself, my account does not rule it out that the belief in Realism and suspending this belief may be 
simultaneous. Whether it implies that these attitudes cannot be simultaneous is a further issue that cannot be discussed here. 
This implication seems to require the additional premise that denies the psychological possibility of entertaining these 
contradictory attitudes in different domains at the same time. However, discussing this premise would require another 
article. It clearly depends on what belief and suspension are and what Hume's theory of belief says about them.
33 It may be so, for instance, that the philosophical domain is preferable from the domain of common life as well for 
two reasons. (1) The distinction between their epistemic standards is a difference in degree. (2) The rational capacities that 
these domains share are merely followed more rigorously and consistently in the philosophical discourse.
34 For an introduction to this discussion, see Rysiew P., 'Epistemic Contextualism', in The Stanford Encyclopedia of  
Philosophy (Winter 2003 Edition), edited by E. N. Zalta (URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contextualism-
epistemology/#GenForConSol>).
35 Hume's Academical philosophy consists of two attitudes. The first of them is doubt, suspension, caution and 
modesty (EHU 5.1 and 12.24). The second attitude is 'confining to very narrow bounds the enquiries of the understanding' 
or 'the limitation of our enquiries to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding. (EHU 
5.1 and 12.25)' These limits are set by a kind of empiricist epistemological realism. According to Hume, experience is the 
standard of knowledge and justified belief: 'experience [...] is the foundation of moral reasoning, which forms the greater 
part of human knowledge. (EHU 12.29; see also 5.1 and DNR 1.10)'
That the sceptical and Realist reading of Hume is compatible with the second element of Hume's Academical 
philosophy would call for an extended argument. There is no room here for that discussion. Yet it may be noted that some 
kind of phenomenalist epistemological realism, for instance, seems to be coherent with suspension of judgement on the 
existence of Real entities. Besides, this suspension does not rule out agreement on what we experience. It is that agreement 
perhaps that can work as the empirical basis for judging beliefs.
36 For what I take to be a devastating argument against any form of the New Humean intepretation of Hume's theory 
of causation, see Millican 2009, §§6-8.
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